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ABSTRACT: The reform operated in the regime of civil appeals by the Decree-law 
303/2007, from 24 August 2007, introduced a new basis for an extraordinary appeal for 
review. This paper states our views on the (in)conformity with EU law of the solution put 
forward by the Portuguese legislator in order to ensure, on the one hand, the legal 
certainty and, on the other hand,  the validity (here entailed in the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU),  by establishing for the extraordinary appeal for review a maximum preclusion 
time limit of five years from the moment the ruling under review is passed, in cases in 
which the decision was made by a court of last resort, that failed to fulfill its obligation to 
ask for a preliminary ruling. 
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1.  Our inspiration for the present text came when we stumbled upon an impressive 
expression used by Judge Cunha Rodrigues to illustrate the transfer (on the international 
scene) of parcels of state sovereignty to supra-national organizations or institutions 
constituted as powerful centres on the legislative front (EFTA, NAFTA, MERCOSUL, 
ASEAN, CARICOM, CCG and European Union), a reality that coexists with the 
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Focusing our attention on the European Union and the judicial power – which is after all, 
the backdrop of this colloquium – the best example of the modification of the «landscape 
of sovereignty» that we can find in our domestic legal system results from European Union 
law itself [rectius, from the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU)] as the basis of the extraordinary appeal for review. 
 
Furthermore, the legal institute for sentence review (which tends to reconcile the 
permanent and constant tension between legal certainty and validity) based on the violation 
of EU law, demonstrates that the jurisdictional power also entails, as a complement to the 
nationality dimension (translated by the rule of inalterability of a final judgement – in the 
guise of legal certainty), the European citizenship (translated here in the basis for review – 
in the guise of respect for EU law).   
 
2. The reform carried out in the regime of civil appeals by Decree-law 303/2007, 24 
August 2007, introduced a new basis for extraordinary appeal for review. 
 
According to the provisions of paragraph f) of article 771 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
(CCP), a final decision from a Portuguese court can be revised when it is irreconcilable 
with the final decision of an international instance of binding appeal for the Portuguese 
State. 
 
This expansion of the basis for extraordinary appeal for review was justified in the 
preamble of this legal act permitting that «the internal decision passed in court can be 
reviewed when it violates the European Convention on Human Rights or the norms issued 
by the competent organs of international organizations to which Portugal is a party». 
 
This provision covers, therefore, the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). 
 
The States Parties to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms [European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)] commit to respect and 
enforce final judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (Article 46 of the 




Notwithstanding, whenever the violation was a consequence of a judicial act covered by 
res judicata, compliance with a decision of the ECHR would be unachievable – in fact, a 
decision, in these circumstances, would not constitute, in light of our legal system,  a basis 
for reviewing the national sentence. The amendment introduced by the Decree-law 
303/2007 responded to this distortion, enabling the 'judicial' execution of the decision of 
ECHR through the legal institute of sentence review of the (national) final decision.
2
   
 
The fact is that ECHR is not an international court of appeal – the access to ECHR does 
not seek intervention of a hierarchically superior court with the intention of cancelling, 
modifying or replacing the national decision based on an error of judgment or procedure. 
 
Moreover, we are not aware, of the existence of any international body of binding appeal 
for the Portuguese State – i.e., any international body that works as a court of a 
hierarchically superior category to national courts. An international court hierarchically 
superior  to which the parties in the proceedings can seek to challenge an unfavourable 
decision and obtain, on appeal, the cancellation, modification or replacement of the 
decision, is to our knowledge non-existent. 
 
However, the ECHR is a binding international body for the Portuguese State, as can be 
read in the preamble of Decree-law 303/2007, the normative point of reference that should 
be effectively considered for the interpretation of paragraph f) of article 771 of the CCP. 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is a binding international instance for 
the Portuguese State, also. 
 
Despite the fact that this court is not an international instance of appeal in the afore-
mentioned sense, it is indeed an international binding court [it is a European Union 
Institution – cf. Article 13 (1) of the Treaty of European Union (TEU)]. The decisions of 
the CJEU
3
 are binding for all the judicial courts of the Member States and not only for the 
recipient one. 
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 In this sense, cf. Luís Correia de Mendonça e Henrique Antunes, Dos Recursos (Regime do Decreto-Lei nº 
303/2007), Quid Juris, 2009, p. 354/355. 
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 The CJEU is responsible for ensuring compliance with the law in the interpretation and application of the 
Treaties and to decide on the validity and interpretation of acts of other institutions and bodies of the Union - 
article 19 (1), second part of the TEU and Article 267 of the TFEU. 
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Since the CJEU is a European Union Institution and its decisions have binding force (via 
the precedent) we can conclude that the required (and sufficient) assumptions are met to 
affirm that the decisions from the CJEU may provide a basis for an extraordinary appeal 




Such extraordinary appeal for review – as prescribed by article 772 (2) (b) CCP – cannot 
be brought before the Court if more than five years have elapsed since the final judgment 
and it should be filed no later than 60 days since the decision, in which the revision is 
based, has become final. 
  
This regulatory framework remains in force in the CCP which is about to take effect 
(articles 696 and 697) with an alteration that we would like to highlight– there will no 
longer be a limitation period of five years counted from the final judgement to be reviewed 
when rights of personality are at steak [article 697 (2)]. 
 
That amendment, I believe, is an inevitable and imperative submission of positive law to 
the claims of human personality – the recognition that human personality is not the product 




   
Consequently, with exception of cases, in which the decision revises aspects related to 
rights of personality, the limit of five years for bringing an extraordinary appeal for review 
will, however, remain in the regulatory framework that is to take effect – the limitation 
period that is applicable to all grounds of review, including the incompatibility with the 
final decision of the international binding judicial instance for the Portuguese State. 
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We share this conclusion with the Portuguese doctrine. Cf. Fernando Amâncio Ferreira, Manual dos 
Recursos em Processo Civil, 9
th
 ed., 336; Maria José Rangel Mesquita, “Âmbito e pressupostos da 
responsabilidade civil do Estado pelo exercício da função jurisdicional”, Revista do CEJ,  1st semester 2009, 
11, 289;  Maria José Rangel Mesquita, A responsabilidade pelo exercício da função jurisdicional: âmbito e 
pressupostos, 18, note 66, where the author defends that the provision entails unquestionably a final decision 
of a national judicial organ that is incompatible with a decision of the CJEU, regarding both infringement 
actions and  cases where preliminary rulings were raised and, in that respect, in violation of the EU law and 
the principle of primacy. 
 
5
 Cf. Orlando de Carvalho, Teoria Geral do Direito Civil, ed. Francisco Liberal Fernandes, Maria Raquel 
Guimarães e Maria Regina Redinha, 3
rd 




3. A relevant question to consider in our view – in light of both the current Code of Civil 
Procedure and the one about to take effect – concerns the conformity with EU law of the 
solution put forward by the national legislator to achieve a balance between legal certainty 
and validity (here entailed in the jurisprudence of the CJEU), by establishing for the 
extraordinary appeal a maximum preclusion time limit of five years from the moment the 
ruling under review is passed, in cases in which the decision was made by a court of last 
resort that failed to fulfill its obligation to ask for a preliminary ruling, whether or not the 




The Court of Justice (Judgment Kempter
7
) has already ruled that EU law does not impose 
any time limit for the submission of an application for reviewing final decisions. It also 
stated that Member States have the freedom to fix, in the name of the principle of legal 
certainty, reasonable time constraints as long as they are consistent with the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness. 
 
The time limit prescribed in the national legal system for filing an extraordinary appeal for 
review [60 days from the moment the ruling under review becomes final – according to 
article 772 (2) (b) of the current CCP and article 697 (2) (b) of the CCP about to take 
effect] should therefore be analysed and considered in the light of the principle of 
effectiveness. 
 
The question addressed is not focussed on this time limit for filing an appeal attached to 
the decision of the CJEU, but rather on the aforementioned limit of five years from the 
moment the ruling under review becomes final. 
 
4. The CJEU recognizes the importance of the principle of res judicata, both for the 
European Union legal order and national legal systems. In fact, to ensure both stability of 
the law and legal relations and the sound administration of justice, it is necessary that 
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 Cf. Judgement Kempter, 12 February 2008, Case C-2/06. 
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judicial decisions which have become final, after all the appeal procedures have been 




From this reasoning, the CJEU understands – and has decided accordingly – that EU law 
does not require a national court to disapply domestic rules of procedure conferring finality 





As a matter of fact, in the absence of European regulations on the matter, the procedures 
for the application of the principle of the authority of res judicata lie within the sphere of 
competence of Member States (in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy). 
 
However, as set by the binding jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, when certain 
conditions are met, the national body (bound by the principle of European loyalty
10
) will 
be obliged to re-examine/review a final judgement taking into account the interpretation of 




Also, according to the binding jurisprudence of the CJEU, the obligation to review an 
administrative decision exists when the following requirements are fulfilled (and because 
this is also a condition, the interested party requests a review in a timely manner):
12
 
- the national body, in accordance with national law, has the power to review the 
decision; 
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 The principle of loyalty [or «principle of loyal cooperation» according to article 4 (3) of TEU] bounds the 
Union and the Member States to respect and assist in carrying out tasks arising from the Treaties. This 
entails, for Member States, both the negative obligation to refrain from measures which could jeopardize the 
attainment of the objectives of the Union (among them, the effective application of EU law) and the positive 
obligation to adopt general or specific measures to ensure the execution of obligations which may arise under 
the Treaties or resulting from the acts of institutions of the Union. 
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 Cf. Judgment Kuhne & Heitz, 13 January 2004, Case C-453/00. 
 
12
 Cf. Judgement Kuhne & Heitz, 13 January 2004, Case C-453/00. This ruling was reaffirmed in Judgment 




- the administrative decision became final as a result of a judgement of a national 




- the national court’s decision, in the light of the  CJEU subsequent jurisprudence, 
was based on a misinterpretation of EU law and was applied without submitting a 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU under the conditions laid down by article 267 of TFEU 
(mandatory request for preliminary ruling). 
 
Another essential condition (as results unequivocally from the jurisprudence of the CJEU),  
in light of the principle of procedural autonomy of the Member States on this issue, is that 
the national court has the power, in accordance with national law, to review the decision. 
 
The transposition of these principles set out by the CJEU (relating to administrative 
decisions which become final by decision of the court ruling in last instance) in the context 
exclusively regarding judicial decisions which became res judicata (not only to the 
administrative decision that became final due to the judicial decision) was not clearly 
excluded nor firmly rejected by the CJEU, as it results from the Kapferer Judgment. 
 
Effectively, in Kapferer Judgment the CJEU, having considered this possibility (the 
transposition of such principles in the context of res judicata), fails to take a clear position 
on the issue (as mentioned above), because in that case the national body was not 
empowered under national law to reopen that decision (recital 23, final part).  
 
Since the Portuguese legal system (through the legal institute of extraordinary appeal for 
review) allows courts to re-examine/review judicial rulings when these decisions are 
inconsistent with the rulings of the CJEU – considering our interpretation of article 771 (f) 
of the present CCP and article 696 (f) of the CCP about to take effect –, the transposition of 
the principles established by the CJEU in Kuhne & Heitz Judgment and Kempter Judgment 
in the context of decisions pronounced by judicial courts will assume paramount 
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 It should be stated that the obligation to raise a preliminary ruling (Article 267, § 3 TFEU) exists for the 
national court that decides on the specific issue in last resort (that is, without the possibility of ordinary 
appeal). The obligation to raise a preliminary ruling is, therefore, not limited to the national court occupying 




importance (as long as they constitute or reflect a minimum conformation with EU law 




In such an event (i.e., the CJEU deciding that the referred principles as regards to the 
requirement that final administrative decisions, made definitive by rulings of the courts, are 
transposed to the framework of courts’ decisions), it is important to clarify (patently)  
under what terms Member States may (within the framework of their national legislation) 
limit the ability to grant their courts the re-examination/review of judicial decisions that 
prove to be irreconcilable with subsequent rulings of the CJEU. 
 
This question leads to verify the compatibility of the mandatory nature of this review (the 
mandatory nature would be present if the assumptions made in the Kuhne & Heitz and 
Kempter case law were fulfilled and if the CJEU established that such principles should be 
transposed to the context of the decisions of the courts) with the procedural autonomy of 
the Member States – namely if, in this particular subject, beyond the possibility of  
Member States to allow their courts to review decisions that are incompatible with EU law 
(considering a subsequent decision of the CJEU), it also entailed the possibility, by 
granting that power (and in the normative adaptation of the national tool for its exercise), 
to limit the possibility of review by (namely) imposing preclusion limits attached to the 
date in which the decision to revise becomes final. 
 
These are issues that only the CJEU can resolve by exercising the powers attributed by the 
Treaties, especially when dealing with a preliminary ruling. It is important to consider, 
first, whether the reasoning from Kuhne & Heitz Judgment and Kempter Judgment can be 
transposed to the context of court decisions, verified the assumptions upon which that 
jurisprudence is based, and secondly, to assess whether Member States may, by granting 
their courts this power of review, confine it by imposing time limits attached to the date in 
which the decision to revise becomes final. 
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autonomous legal order.  They cannot, even in order to pursue their own objectives, make any internal 
arrangement that would result in weakening the Community character and that could shake the legal 
foundation of the European Union. 
109 
 
The relevance of such a preliminary ruling (provided that the circumstances of this specific 
case require this decision) is justified considering that the imposition of  limitation and 
prescription limits may  result in a violation of the principle of primacy if it results in the 
imposition of more restrictive conditions than those laid down by EU law, if the principles 
from those judgments could only be transposed to the strict context of judgments made by 
courts that rule in last resort and that did not comply with the duty to request a preliminary 
ruling. 
 
In fact, this would result in a situation where the individual went to court with the intention 
of enforcing a right that was definitively denied because this same court did not fulfil its 
obligation to obtain a preliminary ruling.  At the direct disposal of the individual only the 
national litigation is available (the right of action), and not the contentious judicial 
procedures in the European Union courts (namely the preliminary ruling, which is 




The question differs somewhat from the assessments of the CJEU, particularly in the 
Judgment Grundig Italiana
16
 and Judgment Haar Petroleum.
17
 These cases were primarily 
concerned with the time limits stipulated for exercising the right to recover sums unduly 
paid (request of refund of unduly paid taxes and fees). The CJEU affirmed the 
compatibility of EU law with the fixation, by the legal orders of the Member States, of 
reasonable time limits for bringing claims or demands to court, in order to ensure legal 
certainty. Notwithstanding, the CJEU also stated that those time limits may not render 
virtually impossible or excessively difficult the possibility of exercising the rights 
conferred by EU law, even though, by definition, the course of such time limits would 
imply that the action cannot proceed. 
 
However, in the case that we have been analysing, what is at issue is not only the time limit 
to file an action in court; the subject matter at stake is more precisely the re-
examination/review of a decision pronounced by a court ruling in last resort when the latter 
does not comply with the obligation to obtain a preliminary ruling. This decision is, 
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 Nor is it in the direct availability of the individual the infringement procedure entailed in article 258 of 
TFEU. In fact, the active legitimacy is conferred, exclusively, to the Commission or to a Member State. 
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 Cf. Judgment Grundig Italiana, 24 September 2002, Case C-255/00. 
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 Cf. Judgment Haar Petroleum, 17 July1997, Case C-90/94. 
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according to the jurisprudence of the CJEU, inconsistent with EU law. In this case, it 
cannot be considered that the individual has not promptly addressed the court exercising 
his/her rights. What happened was that this right was denied – being the dismissal of 
his/her request casually linked to the infringement of the obligation to request a 
preliminary ruling by the court ruling in last resort.  
 
We would add that, in cases such as those considered, the accountability of the State for 
breaching EU law, with the consequent compensatory attribution, may in certain cases, be 





For all that – and assuming that, in light of the principle of primacy, the interpretation that 
the CJEU makes of a certain provision of EU law (within its exclusive competence as laid 
down by article 267 of the TFEU) clarifies and defines the meaning and scope since the 
moment of its entry into force
19
 – I propose a reflection on the following questions: 
 
- by giving their courts, through the institute of extraordinary appeal for review, the 
possibility of reviewing judicial decisions so that they can conform with subsequent 
decisions of the CJEU, should we not consider that the Member State undertakes to  ensure 
(also in light of the principle of uniform application) the compliance of all the decisions 
taken by the courts ruling in last resort, that did not fulfil their obligation to ask for a 
preliminary ruling, to take all the steps in order to ensure the application of EU law? 
 
- in cases in which a decision has been pronounced by a court of last resort, without 
reference for a preliminary ruling, should the State not – by granting national courts the 
power to review decisions which do not conform with EU law – take it upon itself to 
correct the infringement of its obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling (thus 
giving effective and full implementation to the principle of fairness, the principle of 
primacy and the principle of uniform application)?  
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 That is why – and also due to the fact that the legal procedures of the Union are not directly available to the 
individual – the solution provided for in article 772 (4) of the CPC [and article 697 (5) of the CPC about to 
take effect] may be insufficient to safeguard effective judicial protection. 
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judgment (cf. Judgment Khune&Heitz). 
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- again, in cases in which a decision has been pronounced by a court of last resort, without 
reference for a preliminary ruling, in granting its national courts the power to review 
decisions which are contrary to subsequent jurisprudence by the CJEU, isn’t the State 
assuming as relevant the initial term corresponding to the effects of that jurisprudence, i.e., 
the date of entry into force of the norm interpreted? 
 
- alternatively, does this statute of limitation not constitute a provision prone to unilaterally 
alter the initial date of expiry of the norm submitted to interpretation and imposed in the 
name of security and legal certainty, which the State was willing to sacrifice in accordance 
with EU law, by granting courts the option of reviewing final decisions, so that they 
conform to subsequent decisions of the CJEU (namely in cases in which the court failed to 
fulfil its obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling)? 
 
- will the date of expiry established in national law not constitute an unacceptable 
discrimination, considering the principle of uniform application of EU law? Would 
disparities not lead to discrimination between fellow nationals? For example, a citizen may 
be prevented from appealing if the verdict regarding his or her case was pronounced more 
than five years before the decision of the CJEU, whereas another citizen may – on the 
same day and regarding the same matter – be given that option if that time limit was not 
reached before the pronouncement of the CJEU. 
  
5. We recall the teachings of Judge Cunha Rodrigues: today’s societies are «challenged to 
make reforms in which law exercises a central role», with one of the objectives being the 
recreation of «a legal and institutional framework able to provide citizens with tools that 
enable them to exercise their rights in a political geography that is no longer the Nation-





Considering our (Portuguese) legal system and our modified «landscape of sovereignty», 
we believe that it is advisable to raise a preliminary ruling to establish the conformation of 
the national law – which prescribes the limitation period for bringing an extraordinary 
appeal for review based on a subsequent ruling of the CJEU – with EU law, in cases where 
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 Cunha Rodrigues, “As novas fronteiras do direito”, in Os espaços curvos do direito, Instituto da 
Conferência (Porto: Conselho Distrital do Porto da Ordem dos Advogados, 2006), 11. 
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the decision to review was pronounced by the court which decided in last resort and this 
court did not raise a preliminary ruling. 
